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Defendant and his co-felon perpetrated an armed robbery of the Midway
Restaurant in Reading, Pennsylvania. During the attempted escape there ensued
a gun battle in which the co-felon was killed by the police. Defendant was tried
and convicted of first degree murder under the Pennsylvania felony-murder statute.2
On appeal, held, reversed. The court3 in holding that where the co-felon was killed
by police, defendant could not be found guilty of first degree murder, specifically
overruled Commonwealth v. Thomas,4 where on practically identical facts an opposite
result was reached.
The felony-murder doctrine developed out of a need to protect society. Malice
aforethought was the sine qua non of murder in Blackstone's day and remains so
today.5 Thus, without the doctrine of felony-murder, if one were committing a
robbery and an accidental or unintentional killing ensued, it could not amount to
murder.6 It was felt that the robber, being a felon committing a crime likely to
result in death or great bodily harm, evidenced a malignant and depraved heart and
was just as deserving of punishment as one who intentionally and designedly took
the life of another. Accordingly, there developed the rule, the simplest statement
of which was made by Blackstone, 'if one intends to do another felony, and unde-
signedly kills a man, this is also murder."7 The basis of the rule was that the malice
present in the intended felony would transferred to the resulting death and would
be sufficient to constitute murder. There are no indications or early cases indicating
that the felony-murder doctrine was intended not only to supply or transfer malice,
but also to be a rule of causation.8
1. 391 Pa. 465, 137 A.2d 472 (1958), 71 HARy. L. REV. 1565.
2. "All murder .. .committed in the perpetration of . ..robbery ...shall
be murder in the first degree." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1945). Compare this
with § 559.010, RSMo 1949, which provides, "Every homicide which shall be com-
mitted in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any ... robbery .. . shall be
deemed murder in the first degree." (Emphasis added.)
3. Justice Bell dissented, adhering to the Moyer doctrine which is discussed
later in this Case Note.
4. 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955), 21 Mo. L. REV. 172 (1956).
5. Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 365 Pa. 291, 74 A.2d 125 (1950); 4 BLACKSTONE,
'CoMMiENTARiEs *198.
6. Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra note 4, at 648, 117 A.2d at 207.
7. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *200.
8. See Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105
U. PA. L. REV. 50, 59-62 (1956).
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The Pennsylvania statute does not define murder,9 so the common law require-
ment that there must be an lawful killing remains.1 0 The rule which was uniformly
followed in Pennsylvania until the decision in Commonwealth v. Moyer, 1 1 followed
in Commonwealth v. Almeida12 and Commonwealth v. Thomas,'5 was that in order
to convict under the felony-murder doctrine, the killing must have been done by
the defendant or an accomplice or confederate or by one acting in furtherance of
the felonious undertaking.14 This rule was the same in other jurisdictions and
continues to be so. 15 However, the basic principle developed in the three Pennsyl-
vania cases named above was that the felon should be held responsible for any
death which results from the chain of events he has set in motion. The court in
Commonwealth v. Moyer declared that this principle was recognized centuries ago
by Blackstone when he stated, "if one shoots at A. and misses him, but kills B.
(note that the actor himself is doing the killing], this is murder, because of the
9. The purpose of the statute was not to make something murder that was
not already murder-this was taken care of by the common law felony-murder
doctrine-but was to divide murder into degrees, which the common law did not do.
10. Commonwealth v. Buzard, 365 Pa. 511, 76 A.2d 394 (1950). See also 1 WARREN,
HOncImE § 63 (1938); 1 WHARTON, CRImINAL LAw § 419 (12th ed. 1932).
11. 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947). In this case an innocent victim was killed
by the robbery victim who was shooting at the robbers. The majority opinion in
this case admits that this question, i.e., whether or not these defendants can legally
be convicted of murder if the bullet which killed the innocent third party came
from the revolver fired by the robbery victim in an attempt to frustrate the
attempted robbery, apparently had never before arisen in this jurisdiction. Id. at
189, 53 A.2d at 741. The majority in the Redline case declares that this is dictum,
but the issue was squarely presented on an assignment of error and the court
answered the question in the affirmative.
12. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949). Here the evidence tended to show that the
innocent victim was killed by one of defendant's confederates, but the trial judge,
following the Moyer doctrine, instructed the jury that it was murder no matter who
fired the shots. But see Commonwealth v. Bolish, 391 Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447 (1958),
which, though relied heavily on by the Almeida case, is clearly not in this line of
cases and is no authority for this extension of the felony-murder doctrine, for as
the court in the Bolish case points out, defendant was present and actually parti-
cipated in the act which caused deceased's death.
13. The facts in the Thomas case are substantially the same as those of the
Redline case, except that the co-felon was killed by the robbery victim rather than
the police. Following the supreme court's remand of the record in the Thomas case,
the district attorney moved the trial court for leave to nol-pros the murder indict-
ment. The court approved the motion, and a nolle prosequi was duly entered.
Defendant pleaded guilty to an indictment for armed robbery for which he was
sentenced.
14. E.g., Commonwealth v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 50 A.2d 328 (1947); Common-
wealth v. Guida, 341 Pa. 305, 19 A.2d 98 (1941); Commonwealth v. Major, 198 Pa.
290, 47 Atl. 741 (1901).
15. E.g., Butler v. People, 125 Ill. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888); Commonwealth v.
Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. (7
Allen) 541 (1863); State v. Majors, 237 S.W. 486 (Mo. 1922); State v. Oxendine, 187
N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1924); People v. Udwin, 254 N.Y. 255, 172 N.E. 489 (1930).
State v. Majors, supra, expressly decided that in Missouri in order for a defendant
to be guilty of first degree murder where a killing took place during a felony, it
must be proven that the shot was fired by defendant or someone acting in concert
with him. See also 26 Am. JuR. Homicide § 54 (1940); 13. R.C.L. 753-54 (1916).
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previous felonious intent, which the law transfers from one to another."16 (Emphasis
added.) It is difficult to see how this example supports this principle; rather it
shows the weakness of the authorities cited by this line of cases. It is readily
apparent from a thorough examination of these authorities that the court seizes
upon dictum discussion of the tort principle of proximate cause and completely
divorces the language of the cases from their facts.' 7 In the great majority of the
cases cited the act was committed by someone other than defendant it is true, but
it was one who was acting in design with him in the furtherance of a common
purpose.' 8
The court in the Redline case, on the basis that there must be both an unlawful
killing and a mens rea and that the felony-murder doctrine supplies only the latter,
reversed the conviction of defendant Redline and specifically overruled Common-
wealth v. Thomas. The court declared that the decision in the Almeida case was an
unwarranted judicial extension of the felony-murder doctrine and that its application
should not be extended beyond facts such as those to which it applied. Hesitant
to overrule the Almeida case, the court distinguished it from the Redline case in
that in the Almeida case the killing was excusable, while in the Redline case it was
justifiable.'9 "How can anyone," the court asked, "no matter how much of an outlaw
he may be, have a criminal charge lodged against him for the consequences of the
lawful conduct of another person?" 2 0 That is, how can there by any "unlawful
killing" such as the common law requires, when the death is a justifiable homicide?
The mere statement of the question carries with it its own answer. The only way
such a rule could be justified is on the tort principles of causation. But the
16. 357 Pa. at 190, 53 A.2d at 741.
17. See Commonwealth v. Almeida, supra note 12, at 606, 68 A.2d at 601. The
court in the Almeida case cites Commonwealth v. Hare, 4 PA. L.J. 257, 2 Clark 467
(Ct. Quarter Sess. 1844), but the court in that case stated that the reason it was
using proximate cause as a basis of guilt was because if it should be called upon to
detect the particular slayer, where two opposing groups were engaged in a riot and
an innocent bystander was killed, "it would perpetually defeat justice and give
immunity to guilt." Id. at 259, 2 Clark at 470. The language should be confined to
the particular exigencies of the case.
18. E.g., Commonwealth v. Lowry, 374 Pa. 594, 98 A.2d 733 (1953); Common-
wealth v. Kelley, 337 Pa. 171, 10 A.2d 431 (1940); Commonwealth v. Sterling, 314
Pa. 76, 170 Atl. 258 (1934); Commonwealth v. Doris, 287 Pa. 547, 135 Atl. 313 (1926);
Commonwealth v. Robb, 284 Pa. 99, 130 Atl. 302 (1925); Commonwealth v. Lessner,
274 Pa. 108, 118 Atl. 24 (1922); State v. Badgett, 87 S.C. 543, 70 S.E. 301 (1911).
Commonwealth v. Lowry, supra, which the dissent in the Redline case went so far
as to classify as affirming the principle of the Moyer, Almeida, and Thomas cases,
can under no reasonable stretch of the mind be held as authority for this extension,
for though there was dictum discussion of tort proximate cause principles, this
language must be qualified by and limited to the facts of the case, i.e., the homicide
was committed by one of defendant's co-felons.
19. At common law justifiable homicide and excusable homicide were classified
as two different types, there being no guilt in the case of a justifiable homicide, and
very little in the case of an excusable homicide. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMIENTARIES *178.
An unintentional, accidental killing was an excusable homicide while a killing that
was intentional, but authorized by law, i.e., self defense or an executioner carrying
out a sentence, was a justifiable homicide.
20. 391 Pa. at - , 137 A.2d at 483.
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objectives of criminal law and tort are so divergent that principles cannot be used
interchangably without resulting in a great deal of confusion in both fields of law,
with consequent illogical and undesirable results.2 1
The end result of the Redline case would seem to be to bring the Pennsylvania
application of felony-murder back in line with the majority rule, that the killing
must be done by defendant or someone acting in concert with him, and to limit
its application to those circumstances which caused such a doctrine to be developed
in the first place. Although the distinction between the Almeida and the Redline
cases seems weak, based on the thin line between excusable and justifiable homicide,
the majority opinion will have practically the same result as if it had specifically
overruled the Almeida case.
JOHN Wm. RnGER
NUISANCE-PER SE AND PER ACCIDENS-
FILLING STATION IN A RESIDENTIAL AREA
Phillips v. Adamsl
Plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain defendant from building a filling station
on a town lot in Harrisburg, Arkansas, contending that it would be a nuisance.
The defendant's property is located in an exclusively residential area of four square
blocks located to the north of Jackson Street. State Highway 1 enters the town
from the south, and dead-ends at Jackson Street which runs east-west. Defendant's
property is an inside lot located slightly to the east and north of the intersection of
Jackson Street and Highway 1. On the southwest corner of the intersection of
Highway 1 and Jackson Street there is a filling station, and other businesses are
located a few hundred feet to the south and east of the defendant's lot. The trial
court found that lights on poles reflecting on plaintiff's residence, the noise and
vibration of automobiles and diesel trucks starting from a stop, and the fumes from
gasoline and oils and other volatile substances (even though the station was
operated in a careful and prudent manner) would constitute recurring and irrepar-
able damage to the adjoining owners. On this basis the trial court enjoined the
further construction of the service station. On appeal, held, affirmed. A filling station
in a residential area is not a nuisance per se and whether or not its construction
will be enjoined is a question of fact to be determined by the chancellor and the
findings of the chancellor will not be reversed unless clearly contrary to the weight
of the evidence.
The number of automobiles traveling upon our nation's highways increases
rapidly each year. Facilities for servicing these automobiles must be provided and
the providing of these services has become a major business enterprise. A property
owner wishes to use his property to meet this need and also to provide himself a
benefit. The home owner, especially in a suburban area, has probably moved into
the suburbs to escape the ever increasing noise and distraction of our cities. So
21. See 96 U. PA. L. REv. 278, 280 (1947).
1. 309 S.W.2d 205 (Ark. 1958).
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we have the conflicting interests of the residence owner (who feels that he cannot
properly enjoy his property) and the business property owner (who feels that he
would be denied a reasonable use of his property if he could not develop it as a
service station). In many cases zoning ordinances restrict the building of commercial
buildings in a residential district. In other cases there are use restrictions in the
deeds to property that restrict the use of the land to residential purposes. This Case
Note will be limited to the discussion of whether or not a filling station which is inap-
propriately located in a residential area is a common law nuisance. No attempt will be
made to consider the cases where there are applicable zoning ordinances or use
restrictions involved.
With the exception of Pennsylvania, the courts of the United States have been
in accord that a properly operated drive-in gasoline filling station for the sale of
gasoline, oil, and other like commodities is not a nuisance per se but may become a
nuisance per accidens when improperly located or improperly operated.2 Pennsyl-
vania has held that a filling station, when constructed in a residential area, becomes
a nuisance per se.3 Since a filling station is not a nuisance per se, by the majority
view, and is a lawful business, it would seem that under this view a person should
not be restrained from operating a service station at all, rather he should only be
restrained from operating it or carrying it on in an offensive or improper manner.4
Also the possibility that a gasoline station might become a nuisance in fact at some
future time because of location, improper operation, or other reasons would not
normally justify an order to prevent construction. 5
The chief difficulty, and where the opinions seem to be most conflicting, comes
in determining whether in a given situation a service station is a nuisance in fact,
or will become a nuisance per accidens. In the instant case, Phillips v. Adams, we
have seen that lights reflecting on a residence, noise, vibration, and fumes from the
oil and gas led the court to hold that the filling station would be a nuisance in fact
and restrained construction. Very similar facts have led other courts to different
results.6 In a Missouri case, Greene v. Spinning, it is said:
We are inclined to hold that plaintiffs cannot complain of the presence of
the filling station as far as the noise, smells, and the like are concerned, or
the fact that it depreciates the value of the plaintiffs' property, or that it
constitutes, in a degree, a fire or explosion hazard.7
The court held however that casting headlights into the sleeping quarters of plain-
tiff's family only a few feet away; improper location of a greasing rack; and setting
2. See Annot., 124 A.L.R. 383 (1940).
3. Garret v. Borough of Beaver, 367 Pa. 626, 629, 81 A.2d 900, 902 (1951);
Pennell v. Kennedy, 338 Pa. 285, 288, 12 A.2d 54, 55 (1940).
4. See, e.g., Moore v. Wallis, 191 Ark. 551, 86 S.W.2d 1111 (1935); Wilson v.
Evans Hotel Co., 188 Ga. 498, 4 S.E.2d 155 (1939).
5. See 24 Am. JuR. Gasoline Filling Stations § 2 n.14 (1939). But see Bloch v.
McCown, 219 Ala. 656, 123 So. 213 (1929); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Dugan, 133 Okla. 20,
270 Pac. 559 (1928); McPherson v. First Presbyterian Church, 120 Okla. 40, 248 Pac.
561 (1926); Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1224 (1927).
6. See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Farrar, 171 Ga. 371, 155 S.E. 327 (1930); 24 Asl. Jur.
Gasoline Filling Stations § 2 nn.5 & 6 (1939).
7. 48 S.W.2d 51, 59 (K.C. Ct. App. 1931).
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on fire gasoline, which had seeped into a well, causing an explosion, did constitute
a nuisance. The court would not enjoin the operation of the station as long as the
defendant would take corrective measures to correct the situations held to be a
nuisance. The court further said:
It seems to be well settled that a filling station is not a per se nuisance, even
when operated in a residence district. It may become one per accidens
depending upon its location and the circumstances under which it is
operated.8
By enjoining the construction of a filling station in a residential district when
there is no indication the filling station will be operated in other than the normal
manner of operating any filling station, and the plaintiff has no other complaint
than could be made against any other filling station built in a residential area,
Arkansas seems to be coming close to the Pennsylvania view that a filling station
in a residential area is a nuisance per se. If the filling station in the instant case,
Phillips v. Adams, would have been a nuisance in fact why would not any filling
station in a residential area be one? Undoubtedly the trial court which is familiar
with the local situation and hears the testimony is in the best position to decide if
a filling station is being operated in an improper manner, thereby becoming a
nuisance. But where the allegations are the usual ones of excessive noise, flashing
lights, vibration, fumes, danger of explosion, decreased property values, and increased
insurance rates, should the trial court ever declare that the station will be a
nuisance in fact before the station is constructed? Is it not violating the legal right
a person has to operate a lawful business in a lawful manner? To hold the station
to be a nuisance in fact before the defendant is given a chance to operate properly
seems to be paying only lip service to the rule that a filling station is not a nuisance
per se when located in a residential area.
BosaY J. KELrm
8. Id. at 58. For an interesting discussion of some Missouri nuisance cases,
see Botkin, Nuisance-Parking on Public Street in Front of Plaintiffs House, 23 Mo.
L. REv. 95 (1958).
In researching the Missouri cases concerning filling stations as a common law
nuisance only one case other than Greene v. Spinning seemed to be sufficiently
similar in factual situation to be useful. In City of Spikardsville v. Terry, 274 S.W.2d
21 (K.C. Ct. App. 1954), the plaintiff city was seeking to prevent the defendant
filling station operator from installing two large steel gas tanks above the ground.
Residence owners in the vicinity were permitted to intervene in the action. The trial
court dissolved a temporary injunction and judgment was entered for defendant.
On appeal, held, affirmed. The court said, "The general rule is that mere fear or
anticipation of a nuisance is insufficient to warrant the extension of equitable relief
by injunction. It is necessary, in order to restrain future acts with respect to the
construction or maintenance of gasoline or filling stations, upon this theory to
allege and prove facts which show, with reasonable certainty, that such results
would be likely to follow." Id. at 26.
Since the construction of gasoline tanks above ground was in controversy and
not the regular operation of a filling station, it would seem that the paragraph just
quoted would be merely dicta. It does tend to show that Missouri courts accept the
majority view on the question under discussion and that this case approves the view
set out in Greene v. Spinning.
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